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SET-ASIDES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
FOR MINORITY OWNED BUSINESSES:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATE LAW ISSUES

I. INTRODUCTION

Local governments receiving federal funding for certain projects must
comply with regulations mandating affirmative action in awarding contracts for construction and purchasing.' Thus, a strong incentive exists
for local governments to establish programs which set aside a percentage
of the local government's contracts or contract funds for minority business
enterprises. However, these "set-aside" programs raise serious constitutional issues. In addition, "set-aside" programs may conflict with a
state's procurement code requiring local governments to award purchasing
and construction contracts according to a competitive bidding process.
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the constitutional and state
law issues regarding set-aside programs and to discuss the requirements
of a set-aside program that would violate neither the Federal Constitution
nor the New Mexico Procurement Code.2 First, the Comment will give
a more detailed definition and description of two types of set-aside programs established by local governments. Next the Comment will discuss
the constitutionality of these programs and identify the essential elements
of a valid set-aside program. Finally, the Comment will discuss the conflict
between set-aside programs and the New Mexico Procurement Code.
II. DEFINITIONS
Generally, two types of set-aside programs have been established by
local governments. 3 The first type of program is a "pure" set-aside which
requires a certain percentage of the total number of government contracts
awarded each year to be set aside for award to minority owned businesses.4
1. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 23.64, 23.66 (1986) in which the Department of Transportation requires
a
local government receiving federal funds to set affirmative action goals for awarding
contracts to
minority owned businesses and to make good faith efforts to meet those goals.
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1-28 to -199 (Repl. Pamp. 1985). § 13-1-102 requires all procurement
by state or local governments, with a few exceptions, to be "achieved by competitive sealed
bid."
§ 13-1-108 states "a contract solicited by competitive sealed bids shall be awarded with
reasonable
promptness by written notice to the lowest responsible bidder."
3. A review of the relevant cases reveals only two types of programs implemented
by local
governments. See infra notes 4 and 6 and accompanying text.
4. See Fulilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,
Inc., v.
City and County of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1985).
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For example, a local government may require ten percent of its contracts
5
be awarded to minority owned businesses.
The second type of set-aside program, a subcontractor goal set-aside,
requires all prime contractors bidding on a contract to spend a percentage6
of the contract price by contracting with minority owned subcontractors.
A variation of this type of set-aside is to require the prime contractor to
submit with their bids an acceptable "affirmative action plan" for hiring
7
minority owned subcontractors. In this version, the government does not
require a fixed percentage of the contract price to be spent with minority
owned subcontractors. Instead, the affirmative action plan submitted with
the bid is considered as one factor in awarding the contract.'
Although the details of each type of program differ, the basic concept
is the same. In implementing each type of program, a local government
is establishing an affirmative action plan for awarding purchasing and
construction contracts to minority owned businesses.
II1. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Both types of set-aside programs have been challenged as9 violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. In Fullilove
v. Klutznik,'o the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a pure set-aside program established in the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977." Under Provision (103(f)(2)) of the Public
Works Employment Act, at least ten percent of the federal funds granted
for local public works projects must be used to employ minority owned3
businesses.' 2 The Court found this provision of the Act constitutional.'
However, the Court's decision in Fullilove did not fully settle the issue
of the constitutionality of all set-aside programs. The decision in Fullilove
involved only pure set-asides and did not address the validity of subcon5. Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448.
6. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir. 1980). On a $100,000 contract, the board of education would have required the prime
contractor to spend 25% of that price, $25,000, with minority owned subcontractors. Id.
7. See Appeal of Associated Sign & Post, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 917 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985). The City
Human Rights Commission of Bloomington, Indiana had promulgated a regulation requiring bidders
to submit acceptable affirmative action proposals in addition to their bids. Id. at 917.
8. Id. For example, if two prime contractors submit the same bid, but one has a better affirmative
action plan, that bid will receive the contract award.
9. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution states that "[n]o
State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws." Persons challenging the
constitutionality of set-asides claim that the government imposing the set-aside requirements is
applying procurement law unequally, based on impermissible racial classifications.
10. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
11.42 U.S.C. §6705 (1982).
12. Pub. L. No. 95-28, § 103, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §6705(f)(2)).
13. Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448.

Spring 1987]

SET ASIDES

tractor goal set-asides. In addition, the Court failed to agree on an applicable standard of review.' 4
The Court was divided in its view of the constitutionality of the setaside provision. Three Justices 5 joined in the opinion of the court validating the set-aside provision." The plurality opinion" held that "there
was a rational basis for Congress to conclude" that inequities existed in
public contracting opportunities and, therefore, Congress had the power
to pass legislation to remedy the inequities." The set-aside provision was
an acceptable means of remedying the inequities caused by past discrimination because the provision was neither underinclusive nor overinclusive. " The provision was not underinclusive (meaning it did not limit its
benefits to a specified minority) because Congress did not seek "to give
select minority groups a preferred standing," but sought to remedy effects
of past discrimination by placing minority businesses on a more equal
footing with non-minority businesses. 2" However, in so holding, the plurality declined to adopt a standard or "test," but simply stated that the
set-aside provision survived a "most searching examination to make sure
that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees. '21
Three Justices concurred in the result, but believed that an "intermediate" standard should be applied to determine whether the set-aside
provision was substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives. 22 The Justices agreed with the plurality's determination that Congress' purpose for enacting the set-aside provision "was
to remedy the present effects of past racial discrimination. 23 The concurring Justices then found that remedying effects of past discrimination
was a "sufficiently important governmental interest to justify the use of
racial classifications." ' 24 Finally, these Justices found the set-aside provision to be substantially related to the objective of remedying effects of
past discrimination because it was carefully tailored to the governmental
objective, "while at the same time avoiding stigmatization and penalizing
those least able to protect themselves in the political process."'
Justice Powell, who concurred in the plurality opinion of the Court,
14. See infra text accompanying notes 13-29.
15. The three Justices were Burger, White and Powell.
16. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453.
17. For purposes of this Comment, the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court will be
referred to as the "plurality" opinion.
18. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475.
19. id. at 485.
20. Id. at 485.
21. Id. at 491-92.
22. Id. at 519. Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun joined in the concurring opinion.
23. Id. at 520.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 521.
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wrote a separate opinion stating that "strict scrutiny" should be applied,
whereby the set-aside provision must be a necessary means of furthering
a compelling governmental interest. 26 According to Justice Powell, the
set-aside provision passed this standard for three reasons. First, Congress
had the power to pass legislation to remedy effects of past discrimination. 27
Second, Congress made adequate findings that discrimination against
minority businesses in awarding public works contracts occurred in the
past.2" Finally, the set-aside program was narrowly tailored to Congress'
objective of eliminating effects of past discrimination because it was a
temporary measure, it included effective waiver provisions, and it had
little adverse effects on innocent third parties.29
Three Justices dissented, believing that the set-aside provision violated
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution." Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist joined in an opinion stating that the set-aside provision was
discrimination based on race and, therefore, was unconstitutional on its
face. 3 Justice Stevens, writing a separate opinion, believed that the setaside provision failed the strict scrutiny test under the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment because it was not narrowly tailored.3 2 Furthermore, the set-aside provision was unconstitutional because
it was not justified by a characteristic, relevant to public contracting, that
33
distinguishes minority businesses from non-minority businesses.
Fullilove, with its five separate opinions, provides no definitive standard for evaluating the constitutionality of set-aside programs. However,
most lower courts have adopted the following three part test based on
Justice Powell's opinion in Fullilove.34 First, the legislative body estab26. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 499.
28. Id. at 503-04.
29. Id. at 513-14.
30. Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens dissented. Id. at 522, 532.
31. Id. at 522. They stated that the government may not impose any racial classification for any
reason. Id. at 525-27.
32. Id. at 552. The set-aside provision was not narrowly tailored because it raised "too many
serious questions that Congress failed to answer." Id.
33. Id. at 553. Justice Stevens found only two possible bases for distinguishing minority businesses
from others in society: (1) that they have been victims of discrimination in the past and (2) that they
are not as able to compete in the market place as non-minorities. Id. Justice Stevens believed that
the first basis might have justified some remedial measure but that the set-aside program was not
such a remedial measure. Id. Furthermore, he believed that the second basis was "simply not true."
Id. As a result, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress had failed to "discharge its duty to govern
impartially." Id. at 554.
34. See Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors of America, 403 So.2d 893 (Ala. 1981);
Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d
1092 (1983); Ohio Contractors Ass'n. v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983); South Fla. Chapter,
Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846 (11 th Cir.
1984); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City and County of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334
(N.D. Cal. 1985).
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lishing the program must have the authority to implement such a program.3 5 Second, the legislative body must make adequate findings of past
discrimination to insure that the program remedies present effects of past
discrimination. 36 Finally, the program must be narrowly tailored to insure
that the set-aside program extends no further than the need to remedy
discrimination."
A. Local Legislative Body Must Have Authority
The plurality in Fullilove based its decision on its determination that
Congress had the power to remedy present effects of past discrimination
and seemed to suggest that local legislative bodies may not have the same
power.38 However, most courts addressing the issue have found that the
local legislative body in question had the authority to establish a set-aside
program.39 In Ohio ContractorsAssociation v. Keip, 4° the Sixth Circuit
interpreted Fullilove as meaning that Congress' power to identify and
remedy effects of past discrimination was unequaled, rather than exclusive.41 By "unequaled," the Sixth Circuit meant that Congress is best
equipped to establish the need for remedial legislation.4 2 Thus, "although
the scope of Congress' power to remedy past discrimination may be
greater than that of the states," state legislatures also have power to pass
remedial legislation.43
In South Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of
America v. MetropolitanDade County," the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
35. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J.,
concurring). See also South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d
at 85 1.
36. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 483. Both the plurality and Justice Powell relied heavily on Congress' power to determine
the necessity of redressing effects of past discrimination in upholding the set-aside program. Id. at
473, 499-501. The plurality stated, "[hlere we pass, not on a choice made by a single judge or a
school board, but on a considered decision of the Congress and the President." Id. at 473. This
statement implies that the outcome of a case involving a governmental body other than Congress
would be different. Thus, Fullilove, has created some doubt regarding the powerof local governmental
bodies to establish set-asides. The Supreme Court of Washington stated that Justice Powell's opinion
could be read as "creating a unique authority in Congress alone." Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d at
206, 667 P.2d at 1099. However, the court resolved the doubt in favor of local governments, holding
that a local government does have authority to establish set-asides. Id.
39. See Ohio ContractorsAss'n, 713 F.2d at 172; South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 852.
40. 713 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1983). This case involved a suit by the Ohio Association of
Contractors and several individual white contractors. Id. at 168. The contractors claimed that the
Ohio law requiring state officials to set aside designated percentages of state contracts for minority
businesses violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Id. The Sixth Circuit
upheld the statute. Id. at 176.
41. Id. at 172.
42. Id. See also South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 852.
43. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 852.
44. 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984).
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Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Fullilove and held that Metropolitan Dade
County had the power to enact a set-aside ordinance.45 Whether a particular political subdivision of a state, such as a city, county or school
board, has the power to enact remedial legislation is a question of state
law. 4 A city or county will get its power from its "home rule" charter
granted by state law.47 Other political subdivisions, such as school boards,
get their power directly from state law.48 As a result, Congress' power is
not exclusive. A city, or other local governmental body, has similar power.49
B. Adequate Findings of Past Discrimination
The requirement that the legislative body made adequate findings of
past discrimination is to insure that the legislation furthers a compelling
or important governmental purpose.5" The Supreme Court has established
that remedying present effects of past discrimination is a compelling
purpose. 5 However, before a legislative body can pass legislation to
remedy effects of past discrimination, it must establish the need for such
legislation.5 2 The legislative body may not act upon general knowledge
of societal discrimination. 3 Rather, the government must produce findings
that it has discriminated against minority businesses in the past and that
present effects of past discrimination exist.54
Two issues arise regarding the findings of past discrimination made by
a governmental body. Most often the issue is whether the findings are
adequate. In J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond,5 the Fourth Circuit
45. Id. at 852.
46. id.
47. Id. A home rule charter allows a municipality to exercise all legislative powers and perform
all functions necessary for maximum self-government not expressly denied by general state law.
Apodaca v. Wilson, 86 N.M. 516, 518, 525 P.2d 876, 878 (1974).
48. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d
1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1980).
49. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 852.
50. According to Powell the standard should be "compelling." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell,
J., concurring). According to Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, the standard should be the intermediate "important." Id. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 499.
52. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1847-48 (1986).
53. Id. at 1848. The Court stated, "[slocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy." Id.
54. Id. In Fullilove, the Court stated that the evidence that Congress had gathered was sufficient
to conclude that the federal government had engaged in past discrimination, "even absent any
intentional discrimination or other unlawful conduct." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478. Citing Fullilove,
the court in Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City and County of San Francisco stated that
the city was not required to find that it had intentionally discriminated against minority contractors.
619 F. Supp. 334, 340 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Such a requirement would "practically preclude remedial
efforts because the legislative body would not risk the liability such an admission might bring." Id.
55. 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3327 (1986). Croson was the sole bidder
for a city plumbing contract but was not awarded the contract because the bid did not comply with
the city's subcontractor goal program. Id. at 182. Challenging the city's program, Croson argued
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found that the findings of the city council that governmental discrimination
had contributed to the low percentage of public contracts awarded to
minority contractors were adequate.56 The City of Richmond had relied
on statistical evidence that, although minority groups constituted 50% of
the city's population, only .67% of the city's contracts for a five-year
period were awarded to minority businesses.57 The court held that the
city's determination of the need for set-asides based on the percentage
of minorities in the population, rather than the percentage of minority
businesses in the business community was reasonable.58
The Supreme Court, however, may not find that the disparity between
the percentage of minorities in the general population and the percentage
of contracts awarded to minority businesses is an adequate finding of
discrimination to justify set-asides.59 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education' the Court stated that statistical evidence of prior discrimination should involve the percentage of qualified workers in the relevant
labor market. 6' The relevant labor market for set-asides is the business
community, not the general population. Therefore, an adequate finding
should include the disparity between the percentage of minority businesss
and the percentage of non-minority businesses receiving government contracts, as well as the disparity between the percentage of minority businesses in the business community and the percentage of government
contracts awarded to minorities.
Use of the more specific statistics will not necessarily result in a finding
that set-asides are unnecessary. The disparity need not be as great as the
disparity found in Croson (50% minorities in population; .67% contracts
awarded to minorities). 62 The disparity found in Fullilove was much less
(17% minorities in population; 4% minority contractors in business community).63 Yet Justice Powell considered this disparity to be great enough
to find a compelling need for the set-aside program.64
The second issue regarding adequate findings is whether the legislative
body must produce the findings itself or whether it may rely on findings
that the program was an overextensive response to the city's findings of past discrimination and,
therefore, was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 191. The court disagreed with Croson and stated that
an effective set-aside program would "encourage minorities to enter the contracting industry and
allow existing minorities to grow." Id.
56. Id. at 190-91.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision in Croson, 779 F.2d 181, and
remanded to the Circuit Court for further consideration in light of Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
106 S.Ct. 1842 (1986).
60. Id. at 1842.
61. Id. at 1847.
62. Croson, 779 F.2d at 191.
63. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. Id.
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of other governmental bodies. In Ohio Contractors,the Sixth Circuit held
the findings of the state of Ohio to be adequate.6 5 The Ohio legislature
made no statistical findings of its own but simply relied on previous
findings of state courts and executive and legislative committees.' The
court compared the state legislature's reliance on previous findings of
other governmental bodies to Congress' reliance on findings of others in
determining the need for remedial legislation.67 In addition, the court held
that the Ohio legislature did not have to state its purpose or publish
findings on which it relied in the act itself when the purpose of68eliminating
effects of discrimination was clear without such statements.
C. Program Must Be Narrowly Tailored
A set-aside program must be narrowly tailored to insure that the minority preference does not extend further than necessary to remedy effects
of discrimination.6 9 In his concurring opinion in Fullilove, Justice Powell
listed five factors to be considered in determining whether a set-aside
program is narrowly tailored.7" A court reviewing a set-aside program
should consider (1) the efficacy of alternative remedies, (2) the relationship between the set-aside goal and the percentage of minorities in the
work force, (3) the availability of waiver provisions, (4) the planned
duration of the program, and (5) the effect of the set-aside on non-minority
contractors. 7 These factors are used by the courts as guidelines and are
not exhaustive or exclusive.72 Rather, courts take a "totality" approach
when scrutinizing a set-aside program.73 The program as a whole must
provide an effective remedy for discrimination but must not "unnecessarily trammel" the interests of non-minority contractors.74
65. 713 F.2d at 172-73.
66. Id. at 170-71. The Ohio legislature considered and passed the set-aside legislation against a
"backdrop" of information which made the legislators aware of the past discrimination and the need
for a remedy. Id. at 170. This "backdrop" included awareness of several judicial determinations of
the need for remedial legislation for past governmental discrimination. Id. It also included determinations by the executive branch of Ohio of past governmental discrimination in the form of
executive orders to remedy discrimination. Id. The legislature also considered a study by the Ohio
Department of Administrative Services showing the disparity between the number of contract payments made to minority and non-minority businesses. Id. at 171.
67. Id. at 172.
68. Id. at 170. The purpose and objective of the act were "absolutely clear from the text and the
hearings and floor debate which preceded final enactment." Id.
69. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 510-515. Most lower courts have adopted Justice Powell's factors in considering whether
a program is narrowly tailored. See South Fla. Chapter,723 F.2d 846; Pierce County, 100 Wash.
2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092; Croson, 779 F.2d 181; Arrington, 403 So.2d 893.
71. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510-14.
72. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F2d at 855. See also City & County of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp.
at 341 (the court only considered three of the five factors).
73. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 855.
74. Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 173.
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The factor usually considered most essential is the need for adequate
waiver provisions." A waiver provision is a procedure by which a nonminority contractor may receive a contract set aside for a minority by
showing "that after good faith efforts" the set-aside requirements cannot
be met. 76 Waiver provisions are most useful in subcontractor goal programs where the prime contractor is required to set aside a percentage
of the subcontracts for a project for minority businesses. The non-minority
contractor can use the waiver provision to receive a contract although he
cannot, in good faith, meet the minority subcontractor requirement.77
Waiver provisions for pure set-aside programs are not as common.
However, administrative review procedures, whereby the need for the
set-aside program is reviewed, may be considered as serving the same
purpose as waiver provisions, which is to ensure the program is narrowly
tailored.78 In Associated General Contractorsof California v.City & County
of San Francisco,79 the district court reviewed an ordinance in which the
City of San Francisco's set-aside program was subject to several levels
of administrative review.80 In addition, the rules and regulations implementing the ordinance were subject to yearly revision. 8' The district court
found these provisions to be sufficient safeguards to insure the program
was narrowly tailored. 2
Similarly, in South Florida Chapter, the court found that the administrative procedures provided adequate safeguards.83 The administrative
procedures included several levels of administrative review to determine
whether a particular contract should be set-aside for minority businesses.84
75. See City & County of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. at 341; Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d at
118, 667 P.2d at 1101. While the most essential factor is the availability of waiver provisions, the
two least essential of Powell's factors are (I) the efficacy of alternative remedies and (2) that the
set-aside goal is related to the percentage of minorities in the work force. See City & County of San
Francisco, 619 F Supp. at 341. Where a program provides adequate waiver provisions, the efficacy
of alternative remedies is not an issue because the program need not be the least restrictive alternative
to remedy effects of past discrimination. Id. In addition, adequate waiver provisions help insure that
the set-aside goal is related to the percentage of minorities in the work force. As Justice Powell
observed, the set-aside goal may be changed, through waiver, to reflect the percentage of minority
contractors in the geographic region. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513-14. As a result, these factors are
covered by the waiver provision. Therefore, the Comment will not discuss these factors further.
76. Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 174.
77. Id. For example, if, after making good faith efforts to solicit minority subcontractor bids,
the prime contractor is unable to receive any minority bids, then he may be eligible for a waiver.
78. See City & County of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. at 341.
79. 619 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
80. Id. at 341.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 723 F.2d at 853.
84. Id. The first level of review involved the County Manager suggesting which, if any, set-aside
measures would be best for the contract being reviewed. Id. The County Manager could suggest,
based on the availability of minority contractors, either a pure set-aside, subcontractor goals or no
set-aside at all. Id. Next, the County Manager's suggestions were to be reviewed by a three member
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Additionally, a set-aside could be used only upon findings that at least
three qualified minority contractors were available.8 5 Finally, the need
for and success of the entire set-aside program was subject to annual
review."
Another important factor in determining whether a program is narrowly
tailored is its planned duration. 87 The fact that a program is temporary
insures that it will not "last longer than the discriminatory effects it is
designed to eliminate." 8 8 The court in City and County of San Francisco
considered the limited duration of the set-aside program to be an important
factor that insured it was narrowly tailored.8 9 However, at least one court
has held that the lack of a specific expiration date does not invalidate a
set-aside program." The court in South Florida Chapter considered the
periodic administrative reviews required by the program to be a sufficient
substitute for a limited duration because they served the same purpose
of insuring the program did not extend beyond its necessity. 9'
Finally, courts look to the effect the program will have on non-minorities.92 In Ohio Contractors Association v. Keip, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision that the set-aside program imposed
an undue burden on non-minority contractors.9 3 Citing Fullilove, the Sixth
Circuit stated that members of the majority can be required to bear some
burden resulting from affirmative action programs. 94 The Sixth Circuit
determined that the burden on non-minority businesses was minimal because they were not completely excluded from receiving government
contracts and could bid for subcontracts awarded by minority prime conContract Review Committee which was to inform the Board of County Commissioners of the
advisability of the set-aside recommended by the County Manager. Id. Finally, the Board of County
Commissioners was to review the recommendations of the County Manager and the Contract Review
Committee and determine whether a set-aside would be in the best interest of the county before
waiving formal bid procedures. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The Board of County Commissioners was required to annually reassess the "desirability,
and viability" of the program. Id. at 853-54. Furthermore, the County Manager was charged with
the duty of continually monitoring the program's use and reporting its findings to the Board. Id.
These procedures were designed to insure that the program was narrowly tailored by providing the
opportunity for the rules and regulations of the program to be changed. Id.
87. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513 (Powell, J.,concurring).
88. Id.
89. City and County of San Francisco,619 F. Supp. at 341. See also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513
(Powell, J.,concurring). Justice Powell established the importance of limited duration when he
stated, "[t]he temporary nature of this remedy ensures that a race conscious program will not last
longer than the discriminatory effect it is designed to eliminate." Id.
90. See South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 854.
91. Id.
92. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514; Ohio Contractors,713 F.2d at 172; City and County of San
Francisco,619 F. Supp. at 341.
93. 713 F.2d at 174.
94. Id. at 173. The Supreme Court recently affirmed this position in Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1850.
106 S.Ct. at 1850.
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tractors. 95 The Supreme Court adopted a similar view in Fullilove.9 6 The
Court stated that the program, a pure set-aside program, imposed a slight
burden on non-minorities.97 As a result, it is unlikely that a court would
find that a set-aside program would have a significant adverse effect on
non-minority businesses.
D. Summary of ConstitutionalIssues
Certainly, set-aside program present serious constitutional problems.
However, those programs are not insurmountable. With careful consideration and drafting, a local government can create a constitutional setaside program.
This Comment has identified several means by which a local government can accomplish this. First, the local government must establish that
it has the authority to implement a set-aside program. This authority will
be granted by either charter or state statute."
Second, the local government must produce adequate findings of past
discrimination." The findings should include three types of statistics."
The government should demonstrate a disparity between the percentage
of minorities in the population and the percentage of minority businesses
awarded government contracts.' In addition, the local government should
demonstrate the disparity between the percentage of minority businesses
receiving government contracts and the percentage of non-minority businesses receiving government contracts. 02 Finally, the government should
demonstrate a disparity between the percentage of minority businesses in
the community and the percentage of those businesses receiving government contracts. 03
, Demonstrating each of these disparities will be adequate
to show that the government has discriminated against minority businesses
in the past and affirmative action is required to correct the effects of that
discrimination. "
95. Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 174.
96. 448 U.S. at 484.
97. Id.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
99. See Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1847. In Wygant, the Court stated that it has "insisted upon some
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of
racial classifications" to remedy effects of discrimination. Id.
100. Although no court has required all three statistics to demonstrate the effects of past discrimination, a local government would be wise to produce all three because there seems to be some
confusion among the courts concerning what statistic is appropriate. See supra text accompanying
notes 55-60. Before Wygant, many courts considered a disparity between the percentage of minorities
in the general population and the percentage of minority contractors awarded government contracts
adequate. See Croson, 779 F.2d at 191; City and County of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. at 340.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 55-63.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Finally, in structuring the set-aside program, the local government
should take care to include measures to insure that the program is narrowly
tailored to the goal of eliminating effects of past discrimination. 05
' The
easiest measure to include in the set-aside program is to provide for a
termination date. Although this measure is easily made part of a program,
it is often overlooked, to the detriment of the program."'6 Although one
court has validated a program without a termination date,"°7 the Supreme
Court has indicated that it considers this measure to be important.' 8
Another critical measure to insure that the program is narrowly tailored
is to provide waiver or review provisions by which a non-minority contractor may receive a set-aside contract under specific circumstances.'°
The type of waiver provisions that should be included in the program
depends on the type of program the government wishes to establish."
Whichever type of program the government wishes to establish, it should
be able to establish a constitutional program, if it provides waiver provisions and addresses the other factors identified above.
IV. STATE PROCUREMENT CODE ISSUES
Set-aside programs have been challenged not only on constitutional
grounds but also on the ground that they violate a state procurement
code."' The New Mexico Procurement Code requires all local public
bodies to award purchase and construction contracts to the lowest responsible bidder through a competitive bidding process. 2 A set-aside
program would violate this requirement because the contracts set aside
for minority businesses would not be required to go to the lowest bidder.'
A. The Social Responsibility Concept
New Mexico courts have not addressed the legality of set-aside programs, and other jurisdictions are split on whether set-asides violate their
105. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
106. See Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 403 So.2d 893, 903 (Ala. 1981). The Alabama
Supreme Court considered the fact that the proposed set-aside program did not have a limited duration
to be one reason the program was not narrowly tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. Id.
107. See South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 854.
108. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (requirements of
affirmative action plans under Title VII); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510, 512 (Powell, J., concurring).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 74-85.
110. Id.
I 1l. See City and County of San Francisco, 619 F Supp. 334; Associated Gen. Contractors,
616 F.2d 1381; Associated Sign and Post, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 917; Georgia Branch, Associated Gen.
Contractors of America v. City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. 397, 321 S.E.2d 325 (1984); Arrington, 485
So.2d 893.
112. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1-28 to -199 (Repl. Pamp 1985). Section 13-1-102 provides that
"[a]ll procurement shall be achieved by competitive sealed bid pursuant to Sections 13-1-76 to 131-83." Id.
113. See Arrington, 403 So.2d at 899.
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competitive bidding statutes." 4 Several courts upholding the legality of
set-asides have found that the definition of "responsible bidder" in the
procurement statute includes "socially" responsible as well as financially
responsible.' 5 However, other jurisdictions have declined to adopt the
concept of social responsibility and held set-asides in violation of their
procurement codes." 6
In S.N. Nielsen Co. v. Public Building Commission of Chicago,"' the
Illinois Supreme Court stated that the Fair Employment Practices Act of
Illinois"' established the state's antidiscriminatory policy.' 9 The court
further stated that adoption of an antidiscrimination policy indicated the
legislature's intention that the social responsibility of the contractor should
be a concern in awarding contracts.' 2 ° Therefore, the Building Commission's affirmative action requirements did not violate the lowest responsible bidder requirement of the procurement statute. 121
The Supreme Court of Washington adopted the social responsibility
criterion in Southwest Washington Chapter, National ElectricalContractors Association v. Pierce County.' 22 Citing Nielsen, the court stated that
the word "responsible" indicated the legislative intent to include the social
responsibility of a contractor when considering bids on public contracts. 123
As a result, an affirmative action plan which required contractors to award
12% of the contract amount 1to
minority subcontractors did not violate
24
the state procurement statute.
Most recently, the Court of Appeals of Indiana upheld a requirement
that each bidder for a public contract include in its bid a description of
its affirmative action program that must be approved before the bid is
accepted. 25 The court held that the affirmative action requirement did not
114. See City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. 397, 321 S.E.2d 325; Arrington, 403 So.2d 893; Associated
Sign & Post, 485 N.E.2d 917; S.N. Nielsen Co. v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 81 111. 2d 290,
410 N.E.2d 40 (1980); Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092.
115. See, e.g., Nielsen, 81 111. 2d 290, 410 N.E.2d 40; Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667
P.2d 1092; Associated Sign & Post, 485 N.E.2d 917.
116. See Arrington, 403 So.2d 893; Associated Gen. Contractors, 616 F.2d 1381.
117. 81111. 2d 290, 410 N.E.2d 40 (1980). In Nielsen, the Building Commission required bidders
to apply its "canvassing formula" under which a bidder receives credits for the percentage of hours
to be worked by minority members. Id. at 42. These credits operate to lower a bidder's actual bid
to an "award criteria figure." Id. The bidder with the lowest award criteria figure receives the
contract. Id. S.N. Nielsen Co. failed to apply the canvassing formula. Id. Consequently, although
its bid was lowest, its award criteria figure was not. Id. When the Building Commission awarded
the bid to another bidder, S.N. Nielsen Co. filed suit claiming that the Building Commission's
decision violated ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, par. 1050 (1979) which required the Commission to award
contracts to the lowest responsible bidder. Id.
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, par. 85 (1979).
119. Nielsen, 81 111. 2d at 293,410 N.E.2d at 43.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983).
123. Id.at 113, 667 P.2d at 1096.
124. Id.
125. Associated Sign & Post, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 917.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

violate the state procurement statute which required government agencies
26
to award contracts to the lowest responsible and responsive bidders.'
The court noted that the statute affords the government agency "wide
discretion" in awarding contracts, including consideration of the social
responsibility of the bidder as well as his financial responsibility.'27 The
court would defer to the judgment of the agency and reverse the agency
only if its decision was clearly arbitrary, corrupt or fraudulent.' 28 As a
result, the agency could determine, on the basis of the proposed affirmative action plan, that the lowest bidder was not the lowest responsible
'
bidder. 29
In each of the above cases establishing the "social responsibility"
concept,' 30 the court was looking at affirmative action requirements involving subcontractor goal set-asides. One court has applied the concept
of social responsibility to a pure set-aside program. '' The District Court
in City and County of San Franciscoheld that an ordinance establishing
a pure set-aside program did not violate the city's charter which required32
contracts to be awarded to the lowest reliable and responsible bidder.'
The court stated that a home rule charter, such as the charter of the City
of San Francisco, "should be liberally construed, and only when it ex33
pressly prohibits the ordinance, does it render the ordinance invalid."
The court then concluded that the charter did not prohibit the set-aside
program because the term "responsible" was broad and not expressly or
necessarily limited to work quality.'34 Thus, the City of San Francisco
was authorized by its charter to interpret "responsible" as more than work
quality and could require social responsibility."'
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the decisions in Pierce
County and Nielsen. 136 However, reliance on these decisions appears to
be misplaced because those decisions dealt only with subcontractor goal
set-asides. The concept of "social responsibility" does not apply to pure
set-aside programs because state procurement codes requiring contracts
to be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder require the bidder, not the
government, to be responsible. Therefore, when social responsibility is
required, it is required only of the bidder, not of the government. How126. Id. at 923.
127. Id.at 923-24.
128. Id.
129. ld. at 925.
130. Nielsen, 81 111.2d 290, 410 N.E.2d 40; Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092;
Associated Sign & Post, 485 N.E.2d 917.
131. City and County of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334.
132. Id. at 336.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 337.
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ever, applying social responsibility to a pure set-aside program would
require the government to exercise social responsibility by hiring a certain
number or percentage of minority contractors. As a result, a pure setaside program, which is not justified by the social responsibility concept,
may violate the Procurement Code where a subcontractor goal program
may not.
Several courts have refused to apply the social responsibility concept
and held subcontractor goal set-aside programs in violation of competitive
bidding procurement statutes. 137 In Arrington v. Associated General Contractors,138 the Supreme Court of Alabama strictly construed the state
competitive bidding procurement statute and held that the government's
discretion in determining the lowest responsible bidder was not unlimited. 39
' The court held that the government's discretion was limited to
consideration of those bid requirements, or specifications, reasonably
related to contract requirements or product quality." °
In Associated General Contractorsof California v. San Francisco Unified School District,"' the Associated General Contractors challenged
the affirmative action policy adopted by the San Francisco Board of
Education establishing a subcontractor goal program. 42
' The Ninth Circuit
held that the state competitive bidding statute prohibited the School Board
from considering factors other than the amount of the bid, minimum
financial qualifications of the bidder, and the quality of the bidder's past
work. ' In so holding, the Ninth Circuit applied an earlier decision of
the California Supreme Court in Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic
Center Authority v. Superior Court.'4 In Inglewood, the court held that
the term "lowest responsible bidder" did not allow the county to award
a contract to the next-to-lowest bidder because he was more qualified
than the lowest bidder.'45 The contract must go to the lowest bidder as
long as he was qualified to do the particular work, regardless of whether
the next bidder was better qualified. " The California Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit construed the term "lowest responsible bidder" strictly,
leaving no room for the concept of social responsibility.
137. Associated Gen. Contractors, 616 F.2d 1381; Arrington, 403 So.2d 893; City of Atlanta,
253 Ga. 397, 321 S.E.2d 325; M.G.M. Constr. Co. v. Alameda County, 615 F. Supp 149 (N.D.
Cal. 1985).
138. 403 So.2d 893 (1981).
139. Id.at 898-99.
140. Id.
141. 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1980).
142. Id.at 1383.
143. Id.at 1385.
144. 7 Cal. 3d 861, 500 P.2d 601, 103 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1972). See also Associated Gen. Contractors, 616 F.2d at 1385.
145. Inglewood, 7 Cal. 3d at 867, 500 P.2d at 604, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
146. Id.
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Adoption of the concept of social responsibility is critical to determining whether set-asides violate the Procurement Code. However, New
Mexico courts have not yet addressed the question of whether lowest
responsible bidder includes social responsibility. The New Mexico Procurement Code requires local government bodies to award contracts by
competitive sealed bidding to the lowest responsible bidder. 47 A "responsible bidder" is a bidder who submits a "responsible bid" and who
furnishes, when required, proof that "his financial resources, production
or service facilities, personnel, service reputation and experience are
adequate" to perform the contract.'4 ' This definition of responsible bidder
does not include any reference to social responsibility. Rather, the definition lists several factors specifically, each related to skills and financial
capability. 149 New Mexico courts could follow courts in other jurisdictions
faced with similar statutes who have looked to the purposes of the statute
to determine whether the legislature intended to include social responsibility. ,S'
Some courts have held that the purposes of the lowest responsible
bidder requirement allowed the government to consider the social responsibility of the bidders in determining the lowest responsible bidder."'
For example, in Pierce County, the Washington Supreme Court identified
two purposes of the bidding statute. 52 First, the statute was designed to
protect the public from fraud, collusion, and favoritism.' 53 Second, the
statute provides a fair forum in which contractors may bid on public
contracts. 5 4 The court stated that "permitting rejection of bids due to
failure to meet published affirmative action requirements presents no
danger of fraud, collusion, or favoritism and in fact advances the broader
public interest by alleviating the effects of past discrimination.""'j5 In
addition, the court stated that affirmative action requirements provide a
fair forum for subcontractors disadvantaged by the effects of past dis147. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1-102, 13-1-108 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
148. Id. at § 13-1-82.

149. Id. The factors listed in Section 13-1-82 are similar to the factors courts in other jurisdictions
have considered in determining what is a responsible bidder. For example, in Associated Gen.
Contractors, the Ninth Circuit limited the factors to be considered to financial qualifications of the
bidder and quality of the bidder's past work. Associated Gen. Contractors, 616 F.2d at 1385.
Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court held that, under the state's competitive bidding statute, the
government's discretion in awarding contracts was limited to consideration of factors reasonably
related to contract requirements or product quality. Arrington, 403 So.2d at 898-99.
150. See Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092; City and County of San Francisco,
619 F. Supp. 334; Arrington, 403 So.2d 893; City of Atlanta, 321 S.E.2d 325.
151. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d at 103, 667 P.2d at 1096; City and County of San Francisco,
619 F. Supp. at 337 (citing Pierce County).
152. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d at 203, 667 P.2d at 1096.
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. Id.
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crimination.' 56 Thus, affirmative action furthers the second purpose
of
57
the statute of providing a fair forum for public contract bidding.'
On the other hand, at least two courts have held that affirmative action
requirements are contrary to the purposes of the competitive bidding
statute. 58
' In Arrington, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the City
of Birmingham's subcontractor goal program frustrated open competitive
bidding because the program deterred participation in the bidding process
by imposing time consuming and costly requirements.' 5 9 In City of Atlanta, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that the purposes of the lowest
responsible bidder requirement in the Atlanta City Charter were to insure
that the contracts were awarded without favoritism and to obtain reasonable quality at the lowest cost."' The court held that the City's subcontractor goal program conflicted with these purposes of the bid requirement. 6 '
The courts in both Arrington and City of Atlanta limited the factors to
be considered in determining the lowest responsible bidder to economic
factors, skill, and quality.'62
New Mexico courts also look to the purposes of the Procurement Code
to define the government's discretion in determining the lowest responsible bidder.'63 Section 13-1-29 of the Procurement Code states that the
purposes of the code are to "provide for the fair and equitable treatment
of all persons involved in public procurement, to maximize the purchasing
value of public funds and to provide safeguards for maintaining a procurement system of quality and integrity. "'" Furthermore, the New Mexico Court of Appeals identified two purposes of the statute in State v.
New Mexico Department of Finance and Administration.'6 5 The court
stated that the goal of the statute was to secure goods and services for
the public in accordance with specifications at the lowest cost. " In addition, the court recognized a secondary purpose of providing a fair forum
for contractors wishing to bid on public contracts. 67
' The court stated that
by providing a fair forum for bidding, the state ensures that the public
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Arrington, 403 So.2d at 899; City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. at 400, 321 S.E.2d at 328.
159. 403 So.2d at 899. The court stated that the program deterred participation in the bidding
process because "the ordinance requirements are time consuming and costly to contractors." Id.
160. City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. at 400, 321 S.E.2d at 328.
161. Id. The court did not explain exactly how the subcontractor goal set-aside program conflicted
with the purposes of the lowest bidder requirement of the city charter. Id.
162. See Arrington, 403 So.2d at 899; City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. at 400, 321 S.E.2d at 328.
163. State v. N.M. Dept. of Fin. and Admin., 103 N.M. 167, 170, 704 P.2d 79, 82 (Ct. App.
1985).
164. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
165. New Mexico Dept. of Fin.andAdmin., 103 N.M. at 171-72, 704 P.2d at 83-84.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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receives the benefits of competitive bidding.' 68 However, the court did
not discuss what it considers to be a fair forum, nor what it considers to
be the benefits of competitive bidding. Thus, the court's statement could
lead to two different conclusions regarding set-asides.
First, New Mexico courts could adopt the view that the purpose of
providing a fair forum for bidding is to ensure that the public gets quality
goods and services at the lowest possible cost. Affirmative action setaside programs would raise the cost of most goods and services. Therefore, set-asides would conflict with the purposes of the procurement code.
This is the position taken by the Alabama and Georgia Supreme Courts. 69
On the other hand, New Mexico courts could take the view that there
are non-economic benefits to be derived from competitive bidding. A
bidding forum in which minority contractors do not suffer the effects of
past discrimination would be a fair forum which would support the state's
antidiscrimination policy. The Illinois and Washington Supreme Courts
adopted this position in Nielsen 7 ° and Pierce County.'7
Whether the New Mexico courts adopt the Illinois-Washington view
or the Alabama-Georgia view will depend on whether the courts look
beyond economic responsibility. So far, the courts have allowed discretion
to governments in determining the lowest bidder based only on economic
considerations. 71 2 In New Mexico Bus Sales v. Michael,1' the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the Board of Education of Grants did not abuse
its discretion by awarding the contract to buy buses to the next-lowest
bidder. 74
' The court based its decision on the findings of the trial court
that the lowest bidder did not meet the bid specifications, and the board
of education acted reasonably and in good faith in awarding the contract
to the next-lowest bidder.' The court discussed neither the purposes of
the procurement code nor the meaning of responsible bidder.
The next case in which the court allowed the government broad discretion in determining the lowest responsible bidder was Shed Ind., Inc.
v. King.'76 Again, the court held that the government did not abuse its
discretion by awarding the contract to the next-lowest bidder because the
168. Id.
169. Arrington, 403 So.2d 893; City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. 397, 321 S.E.2d 325.
170. 81 111.2d 290, 410 N.E.2d 40 (1980).
171. 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983).
172. See New Mexico Bus Sales v. Michael, 68 N.M. 223, 360 P.2d 639 (1961); Shed Industries,
Inc. v. King, 95 N.M. 62, 618 P.2d 1226 (1980); State v. N.M. Dept. of Fin. &Admin., 103 N.M.
167, 704 P.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1985).
173. 68 N.M. 223, 360 P.2d 639 (1961).
174. Id. at 228, 360 P.2d at 644.
175. Id. The lowest bidder, New Mexico Bus Sales, did not meet the bid specifications because
it failed to provide a one-year warranty on all materials, equipment and supplies as required by the
specifications. Id.
176. 95 N.M. 62, 618 P.2d 1226 (1980).
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lowest bidder did not conform to bid specifications.' 77 In its low bid to
supply portable metal classroom buildings to the state, Shed Industries
failed to include loading and unloading costs.' 78 As a result, Shed's bid
was not in conformity with the bid specifications.' 79 In upholding the
government's decision to award the contract to the next-lowest bidder,
the court focused on the economic hardship to the state that would result
if Shed received the contract. 8 0 The court stated that if Shed had received
the contract, the state probably would have had to pay the loading charges
or bring suit to force Shed to perform at the bid price.' 8 ' Thus, the cost
of the contract would have been raised, and the purpose of the lowest
responsible bidder requirement in the procurement code would have been
defeated. 82
'
Most recently, the court of appeals addressed the government's discretion to determine the lowest responsible bidder in New Mexico Department of Finance.'83 The court upheld the Department of Finance's
' In doing so, the
decision to award a contract to the next-lowest bidder. 84
court stated that the government's discretion to determine the lowest
responsible bidder includes a determination of whether the bidder's failure
to comply with bid specifications materially affected the bid price.' 85 The
test for determining materiality of failure to respond to bid specifications
was "whether the bidder received a substantial advantage or benefit not
enjoyed by other bidders."' 86 Consequently, the court focused on economic factors to be considered in determining the lowest responsible
bidder. 87
'
None of these decisions supports the argument that local governments
in New Mexico should consider social responsibility in determining the
lowest responsible bidder. At the same time, these decisions do not expressly limit local governments to considering only economic factors and,
177. Id. at 63, 618 P.2d at1227.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 103 N.M. 167, 704 P.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1985).
184. Id. at 172, 704 P.2d at84.
185. Id.
816. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. New Mexico Bus Sales, 68 N.M. 223, 360 P.2d 639, Shed Industries, 95 N.M.62, 618
P.2d 1226, and New Mexico Dept. of Fin. & Admin., 103 N.M. 167, 704 P.2d 79 were allcases
where the government awarded a contract tothenext-lowest bidder because the lowest bidder failed
to meet bid specifications. The definition of responsible bidder was not discussed by the court in
a contractor must meet
from these cases that
any of these cases. However,itisreasonable to infer
guidance as to
provide little
the bid specifications to be a responsible bidder. Yet, these cases still
what factors, other than economic, should be considered in determining the lowest responsible
bidder.
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thereby preclude local governments from considering social responsibility.
A local government in New Mexico has little guidance from the legislature in determining whether it may establish set-asides. The legislature's mandate that all government contracts be awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder is qualified by the government's discretion in determining who is the lowest responsible bidder. 88
' Moreover, Section 13-1 30 of the Procurement Code, which states that "compliance with federal
law or regulations shall be in compliance with the Procurement Code," 89
,
creates an inconsistency in application of the Procurement Code's policy.
According to this section of the Code, competitive bidding prevails over
affirmative action in awarding state or locally funded projects, and affirmative action prevails in awarding federally funded projects.'" As a
result, a local government is forced to implement separate programs for
its contracts on the basis of whether the contracts are federally funded.
These inconsistencies created by the Procurement Code, as well as the
lack of clarity of the Code, should be addressed by the legislature. However, the courts may be forced to address these issues if set-asides created
by local governments are challenged. If so, the courts should adopt the
social responsibility concept and uphold the set-asides for three reasons.
First, the state legislature has established this state's anti-discrimination
policy in the New Mexico Human Rights Act."'9 As the Illinois Supreme
Court found in Nielsen, such a policy is evidence of the legislature's
intention that a contractor's affirmative action efforts be considered when
determining whether that contractor is a responsible bidder. '92
Second, the concept of social responsibility is consistent with the purposes of the New Mexico Procurement Code. The purposes of the Procurement Code, as defined in the Code'93 and by the New Mexico Court
of Appeals,' 94 are to (1) provide fairness in awarding public contracts,
(2) maximize the purchasing value of public funds by securing goods and
services at the lowest cost, and (3) maintain a procurement system of
integrity. Fairness and integrity are not strictly economic concerns. Therefore, consideration of non-economic factors such as social responsibility
188. See New Mexico Bus Sales, 68 N.M. 223, 360 P.2d 639; Shed Industries, 95 N.M. 62, 618
P.2d 1226; New Mexico Dept. of Fin. & Admin., 103 N.M. 167, 704 P.2d 79.
189. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
190. Id.
191. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§28-1-1, 28-1-9 to 28-1-14 (1978). Section 28-1-7 states that it is an
unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse to hire or promote a person, who is
otherwise qualified, because of "race, age, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex or physical
or mental handicap or mental condition." ld.
192. 81 111.2d at 293, 410 N.E.2d at 43.
193. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
194. New Mexico Dept. of Fin. & Admin., 103 N.M. at 170-71, 704 P.2d at 81-82.
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will further the purposes of the Code. In Pierce County, the Washington
Supreme Court held that set-asides furthered the purpose of that state's
procurement code of providing a fair forum for awarding government
contracts by remedying effects of past discrimination. ,9 Set-asides further
the purpose of the New Mexico Procurement Code of ensuring fairness
in exactly the same way.
Finally, New Mexico courts should uphold set-asides as legal under
the Procurement Code because, otherwise, local government set-aside
programs will be inconsistent and arbitrarily applied. As discussed earlier,"9 the Procurement Code allows local governments to establish setasides for federally funded projects. If set-asides in general are found to
violate the Procurement Code, then local governments will be forced to
implement two contracting procedures. One procedure would be for federally funded projects and would include a set-aside program. The other
would be for all other projects and would not include a set-aside program.
As a result, New Mexico would have, in effect, two procurement codes.
This would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Procurement Code
of insuring fairness and providing a procurement system of integrity and
quality.'97 Furthermore, the purpose of maximizing the purchasing value
of public funds'98 would be defeated by the extra cost to local governments
of implementing two contracting procedures rather than one. Therefore,
if presented with the question of the legality of set-asides under the
Procurement Code, New Mexico courts should adopt the social responsibility concept and uphold the set-asides.
B. Summary of Procurement Code Issues
The conflict between the requirements of the Procurement Code and
set-aside programs is a conflict between two strong public policies. The
policy behind the competitive bidding requirement of the Procurement
Code is to protect the public from favoritism in awarding contracts, and
thus insure the best value for the public's money. 1' The policy behind
set-asides is to remedy effects of past discrimination through affirmative
action." These policies conflict because affirmative action requires some
sacrifice on the part of non-minorities.2 ' In the case of set-asides for
government contracts, the public must sacrifice low cost for affirmative
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

100 Wash. 2d at 113, 667 P.2d at 1096.
See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
Id.
See New Mexico Dept. of Fin. and Admin., 103 N.M. at 170-71, 704 P.2d at 81-82.
See Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448.
id. at 484.
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action. Thus, set-asides can exist only at the expense of competitive
bidding.
Neither the legislature nor the courts of New Mexico have provided
local governments with guidance in determining which policy is stronger
and, thus, whether they may establish set-asides. By establishing a setaside program, a local government may be risking suit.2 °2 However, the
chances of winning or losing such a suit appear to be equal. Consequently,
a local government may determine that the benefits of a set-aside program
outweigh this risk. If so, a subcontractor goal program would be preferable
over a pure set-aside program because it would more likely be supported
by the social responsibility concept and, thus, upheld by the court.2 "3
If the local government determines that the risk of suit is too great, it
is not totally precluded from establishing some set-asides. The local
government may establish a set-aside program, pursuant to federal statute
and regulations, that applies only to contracts awarded on a particular
federally funded project. 2" Such a set-aside program would not violate
the Procurement Code.2 5 Section 13-1-30(B) of the Procurement Code
states that when a "procurement involves the expenditure of federal funds,
the procurement shall be conducted in accordance with mandatory applicable federal law and regulations." 2 "° Furthermore, any conflict between the federal laws and regulations and the New Mexico Procurement
Code shall be resolved in favor of the federal laws. 2"7 As a result, if
federal regulations require a local government to set-aside contracts for
minority contractors or set minority subcontractor goals, then such setasides will not violate the New Mexico Procurement Code.
V. CONCLUSION
A local government wishing to establish a set-aside program should be
aware of two issues. First, the local government should be aware of the
constitutional implications of a set-aside program. The Supreme Court's
decision in Fullilove v. Klutznik establishes that properly structured set202. The Associated General Contractors, a union-like association representing contractors, might
file a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from a set-aside ordinance established by a local
government. See City and County of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334; Arrington, 403 So.2d 893;
City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. 397, 321 S.E.2d 325; Associated General Contractors, 616 F.2d 1381;
South Florida Chapter,723 F.2d 846. Another possible plaintiff would be a contractor who submits
the lowest bid on a project but is denied the contract through application of a set-aside program.
See Associated Sign & Post, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 917; M.G.M. Constr. Co., 615 F. Supp. 149; Nielsen,
81 111. 2d 290, 410 N.E.2d 40.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 129-36.
204. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-30 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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asides are constitutional.2"° A local government can establish a constitutional set-aside program by following the guidelines set forth in Justice
Powell's opinion in Fullilove.2°9
The second issue which a local government must consider is whether
a set-aside program violates the lowest responsible bidder requirement
of the New Mexico Procurement Code.2"' A pure set-aside program potentially violates the Procurement Code because it creates the possibility
that a bidder other than the lowest bidder will receive the contract. However, at least subcontractor goal set-asides might not violate the Procurement Code if social responsibility is a factor in determining the overall
responsibility of a bidder. t ' Such an interpretation of the Procurement
Code would be consistent with the purposes of the Code and the antidiscrimination policy of the state of New Mexico.
M. VICTORIA WILSON

208.
209.
210.
211.

448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Id. at 496.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-108 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
See supra text accompanying notes 127-34.

